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This Article discusses the unconstitutionality of a proposal that seeks 
to amend the United States Constitution so as to limit the terms of United 
States Supreme Court Justices to a single eighteen-year term.  The first 
section explores the historical and continuing rationale behind granting 
life tenure to federal judges while the other two branches both have set 
terms provided for in the body of the Constitution.  Admittedly, the 
Executive’s term has been tampered with; however, the circumstances 
surrounding the evolution of the Presidency to two terms are 
fundamentally different from those purported to support a term limit for 
the Judiciary, as will be discussed in the second section.  The third section 
shows how the separation of powers system would be harmed if such an 
amendment were to pass.  The fourth section will show how this 
amendment would not accomplish the intended goal of limiting judicial 
power, while the final section will explore how such an amendment would 
deprive the Court of its power to decide cases on the merits.  The power 
granted to the Judiciary would necessarily transfer to the Legislature, 
which would support the all-powerful Legislature the Founders feared. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution grants federal judges and Justices life 
tenure “during good Behaviour.”1  However, scholar Erwin Chemerinsky2 
advocates for a constitutional amendment that would provide for an 
eighteen-year non-renewable term for Supreme Court Justices3 on the 
basis that Supreme Court Justices hold too much power and have been 
retaining that power for far too long in recent years.4  He further argues 
that this proposed amendment is the best way to limit that power while 
still maintaining the independence of the Judiciary.  Professor 
Chemerinsky’s proposal is that the eighteen-year terms be non-renewable, 
so that a vacancy is created every two years, ensuring that no president 
will be deprived of the opportunity to make Supreme Court appointments, 
and further relieving the Court of the pressures that accompany term 
renewal or reelection.5 
                                                                                                                         
 1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 2 This issue has been prevalent for at least several decades in modern times and has 
recently come back into the public spotlight as a result of Senator Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 
open support for a limitation on the Judiciary. Supporters of an eighteen-year term limit 
for Supreme Court Justices include such notable figures as Steven G. Calabresi (Professor 
of Law, Northwestern University), James Lindgren (Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University), and Senator Ted Cruz. Note that Senator Cruz advocates for retention 
elections, but has not specifically advocated for the same eighteen-year term that Professors 
Chemerinsky, Calabresi, Lindgren, and others support. 
 3 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ted Cruz is Right: The Supreme Court Needs Term Limits, 
NEW REPUBLIC (July 2, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122225/ted-cruz-right-
supreme-court-needs-term-limits (“the best idea is that each justice [sic] should be 
appointed for an 18-year, non-renewable term”). 
 4 See contra THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS, Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the Judiciary will always be 
the least dangerous of the three branches regarding threats to constitutional rights because 
the Judiciary is in the least “capacity to annoy or injure them”). It is also notable that 
Professor Chemerinsky is adamantly against giving nine individuals such a vast amount of 
power for so long, but he fails to consider that a two-term President will have appointed 
four of the nine Justices during his Presidency, the first of whom will leave the bench ten 
years after the President leaves office. Under Professor Chemerinsky’s scheme, it is a 
guarantee that the President will be exercising power long after he leaves office, as he will 
have appointed nearly half the bench for a decade after his term ends. Under the current 
appointment scheme, it is certainly a possibility that this could occur, but it seldom does, 
and it is not a guarantee in any respect. 
 5 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 310–12 (Viking, 1st 
ed. 2014). It is worth noting that Professor Chemerinsky addresses the possibility of the 
death of a sitting Justice by proposing that a vacancy be filled by interim appointment; 
however, this creates additional concerns with regard to the level of power that interim 
Justice would be able to exercise, the qualifications of the interim Justice, and the interim 
Justice’s future once the term concludes. If a sitting Justice were to die with only one year 
remaining in his term, it is unclear whether the new interim appointee would serve on the 
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Although Professors Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren set 
forth a detailed proposal that would require a constitutional amendment 
fixing the number of Justices at nine,6 the idea of appointments occurring 
every two years would quickly fall apart if the term limit amendment were 
not passed in conjunction with the amendment fixing the number of 
Supreme Court Justices.  The Constitution grants Congress the ability to 
determine how to establish federal courts, which includes discretion as to 
how many Justices are to sit on the Court.7  It is much easier for Congress 
to pass a legislative act than it is to pass a constitutional amendment; with 
this in mind, if the amendment setting a fixed number of Supreme Court 
Justices did not pass, the number of Justices could increase or decrease in 
the future with less difficulty than passing a constitutional amendment to 
this effect.  If the number of Justices were to change, the two-year 
appointment schedule would be thrown off, and certain Presidents would 
have the ability to nominate more Justices than would other Presidents, 
                                                                                                                         
Court for one year, eighteen years, or be permitted to serve a second term as a result of 
having served such a partial term; from this stems the concern of whether the interim 
Justice would be subjected to new nomination and confirmation proceedings, if it would 
be implicit that he would serve a second term at the time of his initial appointment, or if he 
would be subjected to a retention election, much like those used in many state court 
elections. A greater question is presented when it is considered that a Justice could die nine 
and one-half years into his term. In such a situation, would the judicial appointment scheme 
be similar to the scheme presented for the Executive in the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
wherein the interim Justice could serve a second term, only if he has not served for more 
than one-half of the deceased’s term (the Twenty-Second Amendment allows a President 
to run for reelection only if he has not served more than two years of another President’s 
term, so it follows that a Justice may be able to serve a second term only if he has not 
served for more than half of another Justice’s term)? If the scheme were similar to that of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment, a Justice could theoretically sit on the bench for up to one 
day less than twenty-seven years. If any one of these schemes were adopted, it would defeat 
one of the primary rationales behind Professor Chemerinsky’s idea. If Justices were 
permitted to serve more than eighteen years, regardless of the circumstances, it would only 
be a matter of time before the “appointments-every-two-years” scheme were defeated. See 
also Calabresi & Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006). The authors lay out a far more detailed plan than 
Professor Chemerinsky’s and account for complications that may occur if such an 
amendment were passed, such as how to handle sitting Justices, phasing in the term limit, 
and other similar issues. 
 6 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 772 (proposing that Congress pass a 
constitutional amendment pursuant to Article V “instituting a system of staggered, 
eighteen-year term limits,” which would allow every one-term President to appoint two 
Justices and every two-term President to appoint four Justices; the authors note that this 
scheme would not apply to any of the sitting Justices or any existing nominee at the time 
the amendment were ratified). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. III § 1 (“the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish”). 
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depending upon which Justices’ terms were to conclude within that 
Presidency. 
This Article will explore the unconstitutionality of such a proposal 
by first considering the intent of the Founders in granting life tenure to 
Article III judges and Justices, including the ramifications such a proposal 
would have on the politics of the Court.  The second section will consider 
the tenure of past and current Justices to show that there is no historical 
basis for such an amendment, as Justices have historically served in excess 
of eighteen years.  It will also refute the argument that such an amendment 
would be similar in nature to the Twenty-Second Amendment, which 
provides that the President may only serve two terms.  The third section 
will confront the separation of powers issues that would result from this 
proposal and show how such a scheme would have the effect of 
strengthening the already-powerful Legislature at the expense of the 
Judiciary.  The fourth section will show how this amendment would not 
accomplish the intended goal of limiting judicial power, while the final 
section will explore how such an amendment would deprive the Court of 
its power to decide cases on the merits.  The scope of this Article will deal 
only with the United States Supreme Court and United States Supreme 
Court Justices, unless otherwise noted. 
II. TERM LIMIT FOR JUDICIARY EXCLUDED FROM THE 
CONSTITUTION WHILE LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE TERM 
LIMITS EXPLICITLY INCLUDED 
Article II of the United States Constitution explicitly states that the 
President shall serve a four-year term;8 Article I states that Senators shall 
serve a six-year term,9 and that House Representatives shall serve a two-
year term.10  By including a set period of years for which the President and 
congressmen may hold office during any given term, the Founders clearly 
contemplated the idea of limiting the power of both the Executive11 and 
                                                                                                                         
 8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six Years”). 
 10 Id. at § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second Year”). 
 11 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH 
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 37, 40–41 (Gaillard Hunt 
& James Brown Scott eds., The Lawbook Exchange 1999) (showing the debate during the 
Constitutional Convention regarding the Executive and whether he should be elected to a 
term of years, how long that term should last, and whether that term should be renewable; 
ultimately, there was a majority vote in favor of a seven-year term for the Executive; the 
debate included considerations from many delegates regarding how long an appropriate 
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Congress,12 and chose to do so.13  Article III, however, simply provides 
that “judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour.”14  It is significant that Articles I and II 
limit the service of the President and congressmen during any given term 
while Article III contains no such restriction on the Judiciary.  The 
inclusion of a specified term of years in Articles I and II shows the 
contemplation of the Founders to limit the power of the Executive15 and 
                                                                                                                         
term would last, without giving an individual too much power with no adequate 
opportunity for recourse in the event the Executive was unqualified). 
 12 Id. at 91–92, 94–96 (debating the term for Legislators; Edmund Randolph of 
Virginia favored a seven-year term for the Legislature and argued “A firmness & 
independence may be the more necessary also in this [Legislative] branch, as it ought to 
guard the Constitution ag[ainst] encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form 
combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch;” James Madison was likewise 
in favor of a seven-year term, as he believed a term of that length would grant stability to 
the federal government, which he viewed as a necessity; Madison further supported a 
lengthier term by arguing that in “States where the Senates were chosen in the same manner 
as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was 
found to be no check whatever ag[ainst] the instabilities of the other branches”). This 
debate was ongoing throughout the Constitutional Convention until very near the end of 
the Convention. 
 13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 supra note 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (offering an in-depth 
comparison between the powers of the English monarch and the American President to 
show where the powers vary and to what degree. This comparison shows a vast reduction 
in the powers afforded to the President as opposed to the monarch, and it must be kept in 
mind that having been previously ruled by England, the Founders understood the 
implication of changing the governmental structure to such a degree.); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 52, supra note 4, at 325–27 (James Madison) (comparing the American House of 
Representatives to the British House of Commons to show why the Founders opted to 
impose a more regular system of elections and accountability for the Legislature than that 
system utilized by the British government; the irregular system of elections for the House 
of Commons was flawed, in Madison’s view, as the development of the election scheme 
was both ambiguous and discretionary, at various points in its progression); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 53, supra note 4, at 331 (James Madison) (continuing the discussion of 
the British Parliament and the flaws that exist therein: 
[I]t is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and 
uncontrollable . . . They have . . . changed, by legislative acts, some of the 
most fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on 
several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, 
not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same 
act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they 
were elected by the people. 
The Founders sought to prevent the Legislature from becoming the sort of self-governing, 
power-hungry body the British Parliament evolved into, which was one of the primary 
reasons for limiting the power of the American Legislature). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 15 MADISON, supra note 11, at 270–71 (providing the debate amongst the Founders 
regarding whether to grant the Executive tenure “during good behavior;” Colonel George 
Mason found this to be a very dangerous proposition as “during good behavior” was 
another term for life tenure, which, in the context of the Executive, was a short step from 
a monarch, which was the exact type of government the Founders were trying to avoid; the 
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Legislature.  However, the exclusion of such a restriction in Article III 
shows that, having already contemplated imposing a limitation on both the 
Executive and the Legislature, the Founders determined that the Judiciary 
was unique and required no such limitation.  The Founders clearly felt 
empowered to impose a set term on the branches of government, as a 
general matter, but opted not to exercise that power in the context of the 
Judiciary and instead granted the Judiciary life tenure as opposed to term 
appointments.16 
The terms set for both the Executive and Legislature show the intent 
of the Founders to limit the power of those two branches of government, 
most notably the Legislature, which the Founders feared would become 
too powerful.17  This fear led the Founders to create a system wherein the 
Legislature and Executive would be accountable to the people on a regular 
basis.18  However, the life tenure written into Article III shows that the 
Founders intended to create a more powerful Judiciary that would not fear 
job loss and would not feel the need to cater to the people.19  These 
                                                                                                                         
Founders also spent a significant amount of time discussing further the seven-year term 
previously agreed upon, whether that term should be upheld, and whether it should be non-
renewable). The Founders’ frequent and lengthy discussions regarding the term of the 
Executive and its potentially non-renewable nature exhibit a strong fear against an all-
powerful enduring Executive. 
 16 Id. at 275–78 (debating the salaries of the Judiciary and showing the agreement to 
grant life tenure “during good behavior,” with no dissenters; however, it was substantially 
debated whether the Judiciary’s salary was to be fixed—the main point of contention was 
whether the salary should be subject to be increased by the Legislature during a judge’s 
term, or whether the salary should remain absolute throughout a judge’s tenure; ultimately, 
the delegates voted that the judicial salary could be subject to increase during a judge’s 
tenure). 
 17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing 
the idea that the Judiciary enjoys far less power than the Executive and Legislature because 
the Judiciary cannot act unless one—or both—of the other branches acts first. The 
Legislature holds the power of the purse and “prescribes the rules by which the duties and 
rights of every citizen are to be regulated,” and the Executive has the ability to determine 
which laws to enforce. The Judiciary, however, only has the ability to pass judgment on 
the acts of the other two branches and does not hold any power that truly allows it to engage 
in original acts of its own. Furthermore, while the Judiciary can pass judgment, it still must 
rely on the Executive for enforcement of those judgments and possesses no power of its 
own to put into motion the judgments it makes). 
 18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (the chief discussion is 
of the Executive and how best to ensure that he would be both an independent Executive 
while simultaneously maintaining a sense of accountability); THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, 
supra note 4 (James Madison) (see supra note 13); THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, supra note 4 
(James Madison) (see supra note 13). 
 19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing the 
notion that the Judiciary is in constant danger of being overpowered by the other two 
branches, which necessitates life tenure as an “indispensable ingredient in its constitution,” 
as nothing other than life tenure can so strongly contribute to the Judiciary’s independence 
and strength). 
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consequences could result from a defined term that would mandate that 
Justices either be reappointed at the end of the term or leave the bench.20 
A. Politicization of Supreme Court 
If the Constitution were to be amended to set a term for which 
Justices may serve—even a generous term—the rationale behind Article 
III would be lost.  The Judiciary would no longer enjoy the power it 
currently possesses and would instead feel accountable to the people; 
Supreme Court appointments would begin to more closely resemble 
elections by virtue of their frequency and predictability, which would 
directly contradict Article III.  The President and Senate are both 
accountable to the people by nature of being elected officials.  Because the 
President must nominate a Justice and the Senate must confirm the 
nominee, if appointments are made that the people disapprove of, the 
constituency will retaliate against the elected officials who were 
responsible for appointing that Justice to the bench. 
Naturally, only those Justices who rule in favor of the popular 
views—which may or may not align with the law—would be appointed, 
or the Senate and President would face significant backlash and could risk 
losing the reelection.  As a result, the Judiciary would be accountable to 
the people by extension of the frequent appointments with which those 
elected officials would have to deal.  Were Supreme Court appointments 
to become a matter of occurrence every two years, the Senate and 
Executive would be forced to make political appointments as opposed to 
those appointments that would be best for the Judiciary.  If the Executive 
and Senate chose not to make appointments for political reasons, those 
elected officials would risk losing at reelection.  Therefore, Supreme Court 
Justices would be chosen for political reasons to an even greater extent 
than they are now because the Court, as a whole, would be beholden to the 
people by extension of the frequent appointments and the nature of elected 
officials. 
Such is not the principle behind the Judiciary.  The Executive and the 
Legislature were intended to be held accountable while the Judiciary was 
                                                                                                                         
 20 Id. at 471. 
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, 
in some way or other, be fatal to [the Judiciary’s] necessary independence. If 
the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or 
Legislature, there would be a danger of an improper complaisance to the 
branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to 
hazard the displeasure of either. 
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intended as a check on the other two branches.21  If an amendment made 
all three branches accountable to the people, the system of checks and 
balances the United States holds so dear would fall apart.  The system of 
checks and balances would instead be replaced by a political arena aimed 
at pleasing the voters in the moment, as opposed to upholding the law, 
which is the primary purpose of the Judiciary. 
Furthermore, elections for members of state judiciaries have shown 
that when judges are made accountable to the people, they pledge to decide 
cases in a manner consistent with what the people want; this holds true 
even when it is impossible to know if cases to support that position will 
present themselves during the judge’s time on the court.22  The vast 
number of studies on state judicial elections shows that when judges are 
up for election or reelection, they pledge to (and do) decide cases in a 
manner consistent with the views of their biggest supporters.23 
A similarly unfavorable situation would be likely to occur if a new 
Supreme Court Justice were appointed every two years.  Justices would 
feel compelled to show support for the positions of those senators and the 
President who supported their appointment out of fear that if the Justices 
did not exhibit their appreciation for having been appointed, future Justices 
may be appointed who hold different views.24  Those senators and the 
President who once supported an individual Justice with certain views may 
reconsider their allegiance if that Justice were to threaten the Senator’s or 
the President’s ability to win the reelection.  As a result, the President and 
                                                                                                                         
 21 Id. at 467 (arguing that the Judiciary was intended to be an intermediary between 
the Legislature and the people in order “to keep the [Legislature] within the limits assigned 
to their authority”). 
 22 Russell S. Sobel & Joshua C. Hall, The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on 
Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics, 27 CATO J. 69, 70 (2007) (in the 2004 West 
Virginia Supreme Court election, “The incumbent, well known for his reputation of 
deciding cases for labor interest and against business interests, stressed this reputation in 
his media ads, while the challenger outwardly vowed to decide cases in a more business 
friendly manner if he were to be elected.”). 
 23 Id.; Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks Out Against Judicial Elections, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/an-
elected-judge-speaks-out-against-judicial-elections/279263/ (a study conducted by the 
American Constitution Society for Law and Policy found that regarding elected state 
supreme court justices, “The more campaign contributions from business interests justices 
receive, the more likely they are to vote for business litigants . . . a justice who receives 
half of his or her contributions from business groups would be expected to vote in favor of 
business interests almost two-thirds of the time”). 
 24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing the 
belief that periodical appointments, regardless of how such appointments were regulated 
or came about, would destroy the independence the Judiciary must necessarily enjoy in 
order to do its job properly; Hamilton goes on to argue that “If the power of making [the 
periodic appointments] was committed either to the executive or legislature, there would 
be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it.”). 
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Senators would be more likely to pursue a candidate whose views would 
support them come election time, regardless of whether that candidate’s 
views would be the most beneficial in upholding the law.25  Likewise, 
Justices would feel inclined to return the favor in deciding cases that would 
benefit their supporters in order to encourage those same Senators and that 
same President to appoint future Justices with similar views. 
However, a two-term President’s behavior would likely shift during 
his second term, as he would no longer fear reelection.  In such a situation, 
the President would likely resort to one of two rationales in nominating 
individuals: 1) nominees would be chosen to benefit the President’s 
political party and gain support for future political candidates of the party; 
or 2) nominees would be chosen according to the legal interpretation they 
adhere to and the rulings they are likely to make.  The mode of thinking 
employed by the second-term President would largely depend on his party 
allegiance, the national and world climate at the time, and the personal 
inclinations of the President toward one rationale over the other. 
Interestingly, under Professsor Chemerinsky’s scheme, Justices 
would be appointed every two years, which is the same term that a House 
Representative enjoys.26  This calls into question whether one of the 
motives of the scheme is to make the Senate feel more inclined to adhere 
to the whims of the people.  If Professor Chemerinsky’s plan were 
implemented, Senators would face three Supreme Court appointments per 
term. 27 As a result, Senators would feel even greater pressure to form a 
Court that is well-liked by their constituency.  If three Court appointments 
were to occur while a Senator were in office and his or her constituency 
were unhappy with the resulting appointments, that Senator would be less 
likely to be reelected.  This likelihood increases when it is considered that 
there would be three more appointments to be made during the following 
term, and that Senator had already shown an inability to mold a Court that 
is supported by his constituency.  While these frequent appointments may 
                                                                                                                         
 25 See also Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 43, 
45 (2003) (presenting the idea of California Governor Gray Davis that when a judge is 
faced with “a decision that is contrary to [the Governor’s] position,” “They shouldn’t be a 
judge. They should resign. My appointees should reflect my views. They are not there to 
be independent agents” (quoting Transcript of Governor’s Comments on Judges, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 29, 2000, at 8.)). While one would hope that United States 
Supreme Court Justices would act as independent agents, and Governor Davis’s comments 
are likely more on the extreme end of this model of thinking, it is conceivable that similar 
viewpoints could manifest themselves in the Executive and the Legislature if Supreme 
Court Justices were subject to appointment on a two-year rotation. 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year”). 
 27 Id. at § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six Years”). 
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appear beneficial in terms of increasing the accountability of the Senate, 
the reality is that the Senate would resort to the appointments that would 
help them win the reelection as opposed to those appointments that would 
best uphold and interpret the law.  Legislative accountability is not bad per 
se, but if that accountability comes at the expense of an independent and 
qualified Judiciary, it is certainly misplaced.28 
In sum, by virtue of having a Court that faces appointments every 
two years, the Justices would be far more accountable to the people 
because of how this shortened term would influence the elections of those 
senators who are responsible for their confirmation.  House 
Representatives are elected every two years, which makes them more 
accountable to the people than Senators, who are elected every six years.  
However, if Justices were appointed every two years, this would increase 
the pressure on senators to adhere to the constituency’s influence every 
two years—which may or may not be a bad thing, depending on one’s 
views—but it would force the Senate into a position more akin to that of 
the House of Representatives. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Influence on the Appointment Process 
In a Nation with a new Supreme Court Justice appointment every two 
years, it would be inevitable that sitting Justices would tailor their opinions 
to maximize the chances that a like-minded individual would be the next 
appointee.  An individual Justice only holds power when he or she can 
either block a decision or garner enough votes in his or her favor to propel 
a decision.  The most logical step for a Justice seeking to advance his or 
her agenda, then, is to gain the support of as many other Justices as he or 
she can; if that means that support can be gained through the appointment 
of a new Justice, the sitting Justice will seek to ensure that a certain 
nominee secures the appointment.  There can be a feeling of fear if the 
Court is either too liberal or too conservative.  As a result, if a Justice 
wishes to secure a conservative appointee on an already right-leaning 
Court, that Justice may author opinions that appear to be more on the 
liberal end of the spectrum, while still maintaining the holding that he or 
she believes to be correct.  For example, an opinion authored by a 
conservative Justice may not employ the full breadth of traditionalist and 
textual interpretations at his or her disposal, but the ultimate holding would 
likely be the same as if the Justice had utilized all of the tools typically 
involved in reaching a conservative holding. 
                                                                                                                         
 28 “Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independent judiciary, judges not under 
the thumb of other branches of Government, and therefore equipped to administer the law 
impartially.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. 
Federal Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). 
214 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:203 
The climate of the Court can influence the nomination process as 
much as the political party controlling both the White House and the 
Senate.  The recent death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia left a 
precarious 4-4 balance amongst the remaining Justices,29 leading to 
nomination proceedings that were considered to be very high stakes.  
Liberal members of the political community expressed fear—or at the very 
least, displeasure—at the idea of a right-leaning Court,30 while 
conservatives outwardly refused to even consider a left-leaning nominee. 
With this in mind, it is conceivable that an individual Justice or group 
of Justices could perceive an opportunity to sway the nomination and 
confirmation process by manipulating the climate of the Court.  Currently, 
this is not an overtly prevalent issue because vacancies do not occur on a 
set timetable, and unexpected vacancies are even more rare.31  However, 
if vacancies were to become as predictable as they would be under 
Professor Chemerinsky’s plan, it would be common knowledge eighteen 
years in advance which Justice would be the next to vacate the Court, 
assuming no Justice were to die while on the bench or choose to leave the 
bench early.32 
Under this scheme, it would be much easier for Justices to mold the 
Court in such a way that an appointee would ascend to the bench whose 
views were more in line with the views that the Court—or an individual 
Justice—thinks are necessary or desirable at that time, considering the 
views of the other sitting Justices.  The end result would be that the Court 
would feel it necessary to constantly sculpt its own political climate in 
hopes of a more politically favorable candidate being appointed at a later 
                                                                                                                         
 29 Note that Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit was confirmed to the Supreme 
Court on April 7, 2017, and is expected to be “a reliable conservative committed to 
following the original understanding of the original understanding of those who drafted 
and ratified the Constitution.” Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch 
Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court Justice, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html. 
 30 Adam Liptak, What the Trump Presidency Means for the Supreme Court, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-
supreme-court.html?_r=0. 
 31 See Philip Bump, Antonin Scalia is only the 3rd Supreme Court Justice to die on the 
bench in the last 63 years, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/13/supreme-court-justices-
used-to-often-die-on-the-bench-these-days-its-very-rare/ (discussing the infrequent deaths 
of sitting Supreme Court Justices, and noting that Justice Antonin Scalia’s death while on 
the bench is only the third since the latter half of the twentieth century; prior to Justice 
Scalia’s death, only two sitting Justices had died in the last sixty-six years: Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist passed in 2005, while Chief Justice Fred Vinson passed in 1953). 
 32 See also Eric Hamilton, Note, Politicizing the Supreme Court, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
35 (2012). The author gives an overview of how the Supreme Court may become more 
politicized and the protections the Framers wrote into the Constitution to protect the Court 
from such politicization. 
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date.  Had Justice Scalia been appointed under Professor Chemerinsky’s 
plan nearly eighteen years before his death, other members of the Court 
would have known that Justice Scalia’s time on the Court would soon end.  
As a result, the other conservative members of the Court would have been 
likely to author opinions that were more liberal in nature—although still 
holding true to what that Justice deemed the appropriate judgment—in 
order to create the appearance of a more liberal Court, and thereby 
incentivize the replacement of the conservative Justice with another 
conservative Justice.  At the same time, the liberal Justices on the Court 
would have found it beneficial to author more conservative opinions to 
give the appearance of a Court that was more conservative than it actually 
was, which would have encouraged a more liberal appointee. 
The reasoning behind this manipulation sounds in the notion that the 
Nation is afraid of having a Court that leans too strongly toward either the 
left or the right.  In creating a false appearance of conservatism or 
liberalism, the Court can encourage the next appointee to be one who 
would “balance” the Court.  However, this would be an artificial balance 
that would be the result of manipulation, as opposed to the true views of 
Supreme Court Justices.  The Supreme Court decisions would therefore be 
based as much, if not more so, on politics and long-term planning than on 
what the law requires and what the Constitution reflects.  Such 
politicization of the Supreme Court would be detrimental to the American 
system because the Court would fall victim to the political gamesmanship 
that drives the other two branches of the federal government. 
III. TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT HAS A BASIS IN THE 
ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNLIKE AN 
AMENDMENT LIMITING JUDICIAL SERVICE 
The Twenty-Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that a President may only serve two terms in office, with an 
exception for a partial term in office.33  While the Nation has historically 
allowed amendments such as this one, an amendment limiting a Justice’s 
time on the bench would be fundamentally different because the Twenty-
Second Amendment finds its basis within the original Constitution, while 
an amendment limiting the Judiciary’s term would not.  The Twenty-
Second Amendment serves to expand upon Article II, which provides that 
                                                                                                                         
 33 U.S. CONST. amend. 22, § 1. 
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and 
no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more 
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President 
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. 
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the President shall serve a four-year term;34 Article III, however, contains 
no reference to time with respect to how long members of the federal 
Judiciary may serve, or how long a term is to last.35  As a result, an 
amendment that would create an eighteen-year term for Supreme Court 
Justices would not be expanding on an existing limitation, as the Twenty-
Second Amendment did.36  Rather, such an amendment would create an 
entirely new limitation on the Judiciary that was not meant to exist.37 
Article II of the Constitution serves to illustrate and limit the 
Executive’s powers, one of which is a limit on how long a President may 
serve in any given term.38  This limitation that was written into the 
Constitution lends support to the Twenty-Second Amendment because the 
Founders clearly intended to use time to constrain the power of whoever 
may hold the Presidency, 39 while Supreme Court Justices are merely 
limited by their own mortality and “good Behaviour.”40  The Twenty-
                                                                                                                         
 34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. III provides for life tenure, which is arguably an unlimited length 
of time, subject only to a Justice’s death, compared to the explicit term limits provided for 
the Executive and Legislature in Articles I and II, respectively. 
 36 While some may suggest that Congress could simply pass an act to achieve the result 
of a non-renewable eighteen-year term, this proposal forgets that a legislative act cannot 
prevail over the text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court frequently strikes down 
federal laws on the basis of unconstitutionality; as a result, any endeavor to change the 
interpretation of the Constitution must resonate from the Constitution itself, which leaves 
only one avenue for change: a constitutional amendment. While that option has been 
exercised numerous times, it would not be appropriate in this situation because such an 
amendment would be groundless and violative of both Article III and the founding meaning 
of Article III, without any historical or textual support within the Constitution. Therefore, 
if Congress were to attempt to pass a constitutional amendment to achieve what an act 
could not, the amendment would certainly be unconstitutional and inappropriate in the 
American Judiciary. 
 37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (the Judiciary 
“is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its coordinate 
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence, as 
permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable 
ingredient in its constitution”). 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. II (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”). 
 39 See also MADISON, supra note 11, at 37, 40–41 (George Mason and Gunning 
Bedford, Jr. initially suggested that the Executive serve a non-renewable term. Mason 
proposed a period of at least seven years, and Bedford countered that this could empower 
an unqualified individual for too long with no hope of rectifying the situation, as 
impeachment would be inadequate to correct the deficiencies. Bedford’s proposal was to 
elect the Executive every three years, who would then be ineligible after a period of nine 
years—this scheme is remarkably similar to the one that is currently in practice). Both of 
these proposals show an inclination toward not allowing the Executive to hold power for 
an indefinite amount of time. 
 40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (as “during good Behaviour” has been interpreted to mean 
that the federal Judiciary shall enjoy life tenure, it follows that a Justice shall remain on the 
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Second Amendment only served to limit the President’s power further and 
thus was a lawful amendment.  An amendment limiting the term of a 
Supreme Court Justice would not be lawful because the term of a Supreme 
Court Justice was not intended to be limited to a term of years originally, 
hence the grant of life tenure;41 thus, instead of building on an existing 
limitation, as the Twenty-Second Amendment did, such a proposed 
amendment would undercut the existing powers of the Judiciary by 
imposing a term limit that has no basis within the body of the Constitution. 
The Presidency was not originally limited to two four-year terms; 
however, the Presidency has always been limited to terms of four years, at 
which point the President must face reelection.42  The effect of this four-
year limitation is that Presidents have always been held accountable to the 
people on a regular basis, even though the Presidency has not always been 
limited by the Twenty-Second Amendment.  The federal Judiciary, 
however, is different from the Executive in that the Judiciary was not 
intended to be held accountable to the people.43  This key difference lends 
support to the notion that Justices were intended to be limited only by their 
own mortality or by their lack of “good Behaviour.”44 
Such an amendment to the judicial power would serve to limit a 
power that was intended to be vast, and that was not intended to be limited 
by time.  As a result, were an amendment regarding the Judiciary’s term 
                                                                                                                         
bench until his or her death, should he or she choose to do so. However, it would be error 
to argue that a Justice’s term is absolutely without limitation. A Justice’s tenure cannot 
outlive his or her physical life, meaning that when a Justice dies, his or her tenure must 
cease at that exact moment. As a result, death is a limitation on a Justice’s tenure, just as 
the qualifying “during good Behaviour” serves as a limitation on a Justice’s tenure. 
However, this limitation cannot be interpreted in the same manner as the limitation on the 
Presidency imposed in Article II because a Justice may serve for an indeterminate length 
of time and is thus not held accountable to the people; the President, on the other hand, is 
explicitly held accountable every four years, thus creating a limitation that may or may not 
continue for an additional four years). 
 41 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that 
the protection afforded to the Judiciary by way of life tenure is absolutely vital to the 
existence of the Judiciary and the Judiciary’s ability to function independently of the other 
two branches of government). 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”); 
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 4, at 416 (supporting the notion that although the 
President was not originally limited to two terms, the Founders did wish to differentiate 
him from a monarch by requiring him to face reelection every four years in an effort to 
hold him accountable to the people). 
 43 See supra 8–9 (discussing the protections intended for the Judiciary in order to 
insulate the Judiciary from public influence). 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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to be passed, it would create a new limitation on the federal Judiciary that 
was not intended to exist.45 
The amendment process is admittedly very difficult to achieve,46 
which some may argue supports the notion that the Founders intended to 
allow amendments if the proper support could be gained.47  While this may 
be true, it cannot be argued that the Founders intended to allow 
amendments that would undermine the separation of powers system, 
which lies at the heart of the Constitution.48  The Founders expressed 
profound concerns regarding the power to amend the Constitution, and 
they pointedly debated whether the amendment power would be abused or 
manipulated in the future to achieve the government’s ends.49 
                                                                                                                         
 45 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. V (passing a constitutional amendment requires that the amendment 
be proposed by a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate then subsequently 
ratified by three-fourths of the states; alternatively, an amendment could be passed by way 
of a constitutional convention, although this method has never been employed. Passing an 
amendment by constitutional convention requires that the Legislatures of two-thirds of the 
states call for such a convention, then three-fourths of the states subsequently ratify said 
amendment.). 
 47 Many would argue that had the Founders intended to prohibit certain constitutional 
provisions from being amended, they would have written a perpetuity clause into the 
Constitution, thereby prohibiting an amendment to said provision. However, such clauses 
were uncommon when the Constitution was drafted, and between 1789 and 1944, such 
clauses were included in, at most, twenty percent of new constitutions. Richard Albert, The 
Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (András Koltay ed.), 14–15 (2015). As a 
result, the Founders may not have considered such a provision to be a viable option that 
would endure and garner respect in the centuries to follow, given that at the time the 
Constitution was drafted, perpetuity clauses were so seldom included. 
 48 See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(suggesting that the Legislature should not amend the Constitution when a majority of the 
constituents “momentar[ily]” wishes to do so, if that amendment would be inconsistent 
with “the existing Constitution”); see also MADISON, supra note 11, at 571–72 (detailing 
the debate over the power to amend the Constitution, as well as the concerns of many that 
this power was too vast and would be subject to abuse; Colonel George Mason was 
expressly concerned that the government would manipulate this power so as to prevent the 
people from amending the Constitution in truly essential ways and, as a result, become 
oppressive). 
 49 MADISON, supra note 11, at 573–77 (George Mason expressed the concern that in 
granting the amendment power, “no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained 
by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would 
be the case”). 
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A. Passing Judgment on a Federal Constitutional Amendment Would be 
Akin to Passing Judgment on a State Constitutional Amendment 
The power of the Supreme Court allows it to pass judgment on the 
constitutionality of laws and state constitutions;50 it follows that the 
Supreme Court could likewise pass judgment on the validity of a federal 
constitutional amendment, and such a judgment would not be 
fundamentally different from passing judgment on a state constitution and 
rendering a state constitutional amendment invalid. 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has only passed 
judgment on state constitutions, never the federal Constitution.  The 
Supremacy Clause certainly allows the federal Constitution to overrule 
any state laws or constitutions that may be in conflict with the federal 
Constitution, which provides a strong foundation for challenges to state 
constitutions.51  When looking at the role state constitutions play in the 
United States, they can be considered to be the smaller-scale counterparts 
to the federal Constitution in the sense that state constitutions are the 
ultimate governing law for that respective state, much like the United 
States Constitution is the ultimate governing law for the United States.  It 
follows that state constitutional amendments are the smaller-scale 
counterparts to federal constitutional amendments.  Importantly, the 
federal Constitution always trumps state constitutions.  However, even 
with this in mind, if the federal Judiciary has the authority to render part 
of a state constitution null and void due to contrary ideas between the state 
constitution and the federal Constitution, it is not implausible that the 
Supreme Court would have the authority to render a constitutional 
amendment null and void due to inconsistency with the body of the 
Constitution. 
Typically, when two laws are in conflict, the law that was passed 
later in time wins the day.  However, if an amendment were passed that 
seemed to negate one of the founding principles of the federal Judiciary, 
the amendment may be regarded differently than an ordinary law, as laws 
do not tend to alter the very foundation of the United States.  If this were 
to occur, it could be argued that the established Constitution—which has 
been in existence for more than 225 years—takes precedence over an 
amendment that seeks to rid the Constitution of one of its protective 
elements because the very purpose of the Constitution is to uphold the 
                                                                                                                         
 50 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ruling that an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution was invalid because the amendment was inconsistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in this Constitution 
or the Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”). 
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United States as a nation.  If any type of legislation, constitutional 
amendment or otherwise, seeks to impose on that purpose, the Constitution 
should win out in order to protect the Nation. 
B. Constitutional Moments and Other Methods of Effecting 
Constitutional Change 
Until 1940, no President had both sought and won a third presidential 
term.52  In 1795, George Washington set the precedent that established a 
two-term limit on the presidency; no President successfully broke this 
tradition until 1940, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was 
elected to a third term in office. For nearly a century and a half, America 
abided by an unwritten rule that dictated that Presidents could only serve 
two terms; this rule became law in 1951 with the ratification of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment.53 
Professor David A. Strauss argues that the formal amendment 
process frequently has no bearing on constitutional changes, and that such 
changes occur, absent a constitutional amendment, as a result of other 
factors.54  Professor Strauss further argues that absent an amendment or 
legislation to effect change, “Deep, enduring changes in society will find 
some way to establish themselves with or without a formal 
amendment . . . through changes in private behavior.”55  For nearly 150 
years Presidents served only two terms, which is arguably a “Deep, 
enduring change” in American society from the monarchy of England.56  
                                                                                                                         
 52 THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40864, PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND 
TENURE: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 7-5700 (2009) at 1 (“While [the two-
term tradition was] generally honored as sacrosanct until . . . 1940 . . . no fewer than four 
19th and 20th century Presidents before President Franklin Roosevelt were tempted to seek 
a third term.”). 
 53 Id. at 10 (explaining that within two years of President Roosevelt’s death, the 
Twenty-Second Amendment had been proposed and was subsequently ratified in 1951). 
 54 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2001) (“through most of our history, the amendment process has not 
been an important means of constitutional change . . . . On the contrary, the forces that 
bring about constitutional change work their will almost irrespective of whether and how 
the text of the Constitution has changed”). 
 55 Id. at 1464. 
 56 Contra id. at 1493 (although I find Professor Strauss’s idea of a “Deep enduring 
change” clearly applicable to the situation of a two-term President, Strauss, while admitting 
that this is a plausible view, argues that the Twenty-Second Amendment was necessary to 
effect change because of the effects that accompany the mandate that a President vacate 
the office after two terms, such as the effect of a lame duck President. Professor Strauss is 
likely correct in his assertion that the Twenty-Second Amendment was essential in creating 
some of the phenomena that exist today, however, the argument that a “Deep enduring 
change” took effect prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment holds strong 
with regard to the idea as a whole. My argument does not rest on the idea that the Twenty-
Second Amendment was absolutely vital to create every effect that exists today; rather my 
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Although the limit was not constitutionally mandated until 1951, it can be 
argued that the two-term limit had already been dictated and had already 
taken effect in America because it had been in place for so long.57  The 
behavior of past Presidents in not pursuing—or pursuing unsuccessfully—
a third term solidified this idea, and the Twenty-Second Amendment 
served only to formally constitutionalize what had already been accepted 
by American society. 
The idea of a dualist democracy, set forth by Professor Bruce 
Ackerman, argues that change can be effected either through ordinary 
political discourse, meaning that government makes decisions, or through 
the People, which is a less frequently used method to effect change, due to 
the difficulty of accomplishing change via this avenue.58  In the latter 
method, an extraordinary number of citizens must come to care about the 
movement and determine to support the idea, and the citizens must 
repeatedly decide to support this initiative, or this method will be 
ineffective.59  When such a movement has been effective, Professor 
Ackerman argues that a constitutional moment has occurred that results in 
a constitutional amendment as a result of the collective outcry of the 
People.60 
The public support of a few select scholars and politicians in favor 
of limiting judicial tenure is not a constitutional moment.  It lacks the 
characteristics shared by other constitutional moments that did effect 
change; nowhere in the dialogue is an assertion that limiting judicial tenure 
has gained widespread support or necessity.  The other significant 
constitutional moments have all been characterized by necessity, in order 
for the country to endure on, and widespread—though not universal—
                                                                                                                         
argument relies only on the proposition that the Twenty-Second Amendment merely served 
to codify what had already been in practice with respect to the tradition of a President 
serving two terms; any other effects that followed the Twenty-Second Amendment are 
merely ancillary to my argument). 
 57 Id. at 1459 (explaining that on certain occasions, “when amendments are adopted, 
they often do no more than ratify changes that have already taken place in society without 
the help of an amendment”). 
 58 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991) (explaining that 
governmental decision-making occurs on a daily basis, but the people can only take charge 
of the democracy “if they succeed in mobilizing their fellow citizens and gaining their 
repeated support in response to their opponents’ counterattacks,” at which point the 
citizenry can “proclaim that the People have changed their mind and have given their 
government new marching orders”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 51–55 (President Roosevelt’s successful constitutional moment in rejecting 
the Article V transformative process and instead garnering public support to pass the New 
Deal is in stark contrast to President Reagan’s failed constitutional moment wherein 
President Reagan unsuccessfully attempted to gain popular support for his critique of the 
welfare initiatives that accompanied the New Deal). 
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support for the movement that eventually resulted in a constitutional 
amendment or series of amendments. 
The three established constitutional moments, the Foundation of the 
country, the Reconstruction Era, and the New Deal61 were all characterized 
by necessity.  Had the Bill of Rights not been insisted upon and 
subsequently passed, the Constitution likely would not have been ratified.  
Had the North not protested slavery and had the Civil War not ensued, the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not have been passed.  Had the Roosevelt 
administration not sought the much-needed economic reform, the New 
Deal would have been nonexistent.  Each of the results from these events 
is characterized by necessity.  None of these amendments or legislation 
would have become law had they not been absolutely necessary for the 
continued existence of the United States.  An amendment limiting judicial 
tenure is not necessary.  It will not ensure the continued presence of the 
United States, nor will it ensure the continued presence of the United 
States in its current form.  Such an amendment would modify the United 
States and would place it in no better a position of enduring strength than 
the Nation is currently in without such an amendment. 
Likewise, each of the three constitutional moments noted above were 
marked by widespread support. Both the passage of the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment were a result of multiple states requiring some 
sort of constitutional amendment.  The New Deal had the support of most 
of the Nation, as the Nation was in the midst of an economic crisis and 
needed salvation. 
The proposal to amend Article III, however, does not have the same 
degree of support as any of these three events.  While it is true the proposed 
amendment is once again back in the spotlight, it is in the spotlight based 
on the prominence of its supporters, not the sheer number of its supporters.  
Not all great changes in American history have been backed by a large 
number of supporters—such as the Constitutional Convention, arguably—
but those events that endure as constitutional moments have substantial 
support by virtue of the vast number of Americans seeking to support that 
idea.62  This proposed amendment lacks the requisite support to be 
considered a constitutional moment.63  It is neither necessary nor is it 
                                                                                                                         
 61 Id. at 41, 57 (“lawyers and judges are right to look upon the Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as decisive moments at which deep changes in popular 
opinion gained authoritative constitutional recognition”). 
 62 Id. at 6 (in order to successfully pass a “law in the name of the People, a movement’s 
political partisans must, first, convince an extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to 
take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to 
politics”). 
 63 Id. at 6–7 (describing the characteristics of changes that are effected by the People 
and have enough enduring popular support to be considered constitutional moments). 
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supported in the same fashion as a constitutional moment and it is 
fundamentally different from events such as the Constitutional 
Convention; as a result, it cannot properly be considered a constitutional 
moment and thereby gain legitimacy. 
C. The Practices Outlined in the Twenty-Second Amendment Were in 
Practice for 150 Years Before the Limitation Was Constitutionalized 
The citizenry backed two-term presidencies for nearly 150 years, 
beginning with President George Washington’s refusal to serve more than 
two terms.  Since that time, Americans supported the idea that no President 
would serve for more than two terms and repeatedly renewed this 
commitment, as Professor Ackerman argues is necessary for change to 
occur through the People.64  While it could be argued that this commitment 
was abandoned with the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a temporary 
departure from the commitment was necessary, as the following section 
will show.  Prior to President Roosevelt’s four terms, the citizens made a 
commitment to two-term presidencies that endured for nearly 150 years 
and maintained that commitment until extraordinary circumstances 
mandated that the citizens take alternative action for the preservation of 
the Nation. 
Admittedly, the Twenty-Second Amendment was not proposed until 
after President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been elected to serve a fourth 
term, which was cut short by his death.65  However, the political climate 
and world events during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency 
were unique from those of Presidents past, and the events warranted an 
exception to the unofficial rule. 
In 1929, America was struck by the Great Depression,66 and the 
Nation did not fully recover to pre-Depression growth patterns until 
1942,67 at which point, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was already well 
into his third term.  Had Roosevelt chosen not to seek a third term in 1940, 
he would have left the Nation in a precarious position, as the world had 
recently plunged into the Second World War, and America was still 
                                                                                                                         
 64 Professor Ackerman argues that in order for the People to effect change, Americans 
must support the proposal “time and again” until such change is effected. Id. at 6. 
 65 NEALE, supra note 52, at 10 (explaining that fewer than three months after beginning 
his fourth term in office, President Roosevelt died from a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 
1945). 
 66 Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7. J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 19, 21 
(1993) (showing that the American construction industry began plummeting in 1929, 
which signaled the beginning of the Great Depression). 
 67 Id. at 35 (discussing the recovery of the American economy following the Great 
Depression). 
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attempting to recover from the decade-long Depression.68  Any change in 
administration in 1941 would have left America vulnerable because any 
ripple at that time would have made the country more prone to attack,69 
and the possibility exists that the economic recovery that Roosevelt put in 
place may not have continued under a different administration. 
Similarly, when Roosevelt was again reelected in 1944, the United 
States was in the midst of World War II. Although the War ended shortly 
after Roosevelt’s death, at the time of his reelection in 1944, the German 
and Japanese forces had yet to surrender and continued to pose a serious 
threat as the Holocaust continued.70 
It is unclear if America would have accepted third and fourth terms 
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the Great Depression and World 
War II not posed such significant threats during his administration and 
during the election years in question.  However, the presidency set forth 
by President Roosevelt was unique in that it fell during a time of 
turbulence, the magnitude of which has seldom been seen in America. 
These extenuating circumstances created an exception to the 
unofficial “two-term rule” created by President George Washington 
because of the danger that would have accompanied even a minor shift at 
the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reelections.71  As a result, 
Professor Strauss’s idea that tradition and behavior can modify the 
Constitution still stands.  This idea is bolstered by the notion that the 
                                                                                                                         
 68 Interestingly, at the time Roosevelt was nominated for a third term, many of his 
critics attacked the third term by claiming he was seeking to violate a “tradition” 
established by President George Washington. Third Term? Or First Term?, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 1940 at E1. However, some claimed that such a third term “‘would upset an 
unwritten part of the American Constitution.’” George Gallup, Ebb and Flow of the Third-
Term Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1940 at 108. 
 69 Notably, even without a significant change, the Japanese still successfully bombed 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. Had America seen a change in its political climate, the country would 
have been more vulnerable than it was simply because changes are almost never seamless. 
 70 Michelle Hall, By the Numbers: End of World War II, CNN (Sep. 2, 2013, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/btn-end-of-wwii/ (Germany surrendered on May 
8, 1945, and the Japanese surrendered on September 2, 1945; World War II did not 
officially end until the Japanese surrendered). 
 71 Though beyond the scope of this Article, an interesting consideration is whether the 
two-term limit ever became unofficially constitutionalized and if so, at what point? While 
Washington began the trend of a two-term Presidency, it would be difficult to argue that 
he single-handedly established this trend as a constitutional mandate. The Constitution is 
crafted in a way that a single individual cannot affect a constitutional amendment; however, 
Roosevelt, as the thirty-second President was the first to successfully pursue a third—and 
subsequently, a fourth—term. The question then becomes, at some point between 
Washington’s Presidency and Roosevelt’s was a constitutional amendment effected and 
did Roosevelt fail to abide by that amendment? If such an amendment was created by these 
unofficial means, at what point did it garner enough support to actually be considered an 
amendment? 
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Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified in 1951, shortly after 
Roosevelt’s death.  The ratification following so quickly on the heels of 
President Roosevelt’s death shows that the country already considered two 
terms to be the standard, and the Nation wanted to make it clear that what 
was already considered to be the unofficial rule was to become law. 
D. Supreme Court Justices Have Not Been Serving Eighteen-Year 
Terms for Any Notable Period of Time 
While the Twenty-Second Amendment found much of its validity in 
the historical practice of Presidents serving no more than two terms, there 
is no such practice amongst the Supreme Court Justices of historically 
remaining on the bench for no more than eighteen years.72  In applying 
Professor Strauss’s idea that a “Deep, enduring change” can effect an 
amendment,73 it is clear that such a change existed with respect to the 
Twenty-Second Amendment and the nearly 150 years of precedent on the 
matter.  However, the data shows that for nearly fifty years, the average 
tenure on the Court has been more than twenty-six years;74 the argument 
that a shorter judicial term has already manifested itself within the Court 
and within society based on data prior to the mid-twentieth century shatters 
when considered alongside the more recent data.75  If this pattern of 
Supreme Court Justices remaining on the Court for fewer than eighteen 
years had been a “Deep, enduring change”76 of the same nature as two-
                                                                                                                         
 72 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 778 (while the authors attempt to argue that 
Supreme Court tenure “has increased considerably since the Court’s creation in 1789,” the 
authors seem to be looking only at select datasets; when comparing the data beginning in 
the year 1821—a mere thirty-two years after the creation of the Court—with the most 
recent dataset, the difference in Supreme Court tenure shows a change of only 5.2 years, 
which is not the “astonishing” increase the authors would like to portray); David R. Stras 
& Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors 
Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007). 
 73 See Strauss, supra note 54. 
 74 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 778 (the data, as portrayed by Professors 
Calabresi and Lindgren, shows that since 1970, the average length of Supreme Court tenure 
has been 26.1 years). 
 75 Id. The authors analyze the statistical nature of Supreme Court Justices with regard 
to the amount of time spent on the Court for each period of roughly thirty years, spanning 
from 1789 to 2006. 
 76 Strauss, supra note 54, at 1458–59 (asserting that “The changes produce the 
amendment, rather than the other way around;” however, it is impossible to argue that the 
change in favor of eighteen-year non-renewable terms is in the process of effecting a 
constitutional amendment because such a change is not apparent, regardless of how the 
data is considered; furthermore, there was no trend in favor of moving toward such an 
amendment prior to 1970 because if there had been, the change would have been so rooted 
in the culture of the Supreme Court that the Justices would have stepped down following a 
single eighteen-year term; however, the Court clearly moved toward longer terms instead 
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term presidencies, Justices would not have controverted this policy by 
choosing to collectively remain on the Court for such a lengthier period of 
time. 
Many prominent scholars argue that the Founders did not intend for 
Justices to serve for several decades, as they do in the present era.77  As 
Professors Calabresi and Lindgren point out, advances in technology, 
medicine, and changes related to politics and perceptions of the Judiciary 
have motivated the tenure of Supreme Court Justices to lengthen to a 
degree.78  However, the data compiled by Professors Calabresi and 
Lindgren contradict the idea that the Founders did not intend for the 
average tenure to extend as it does today.79 
The average tenure between 1821 and 1850, according to Professors 
Calabresi and Lindgren, was 20.8 years, while the average tenure between 
1971 and 2000 was 26.1 years.80  Considering that in the time period 
beginning only thirty-two years after the ratification of the Constitution, 
Justices were already serving for more than two decades, on average, it is 
difficult to believe that the Founders did not foresee a tenure of this 
duration.  Furthermore, over 150 years, the average tenure of a Supreme 
Court Justice increased by little more than five years, while the average 
life expectancy over the same time period has increased by at least thirty 
years.81  This showing of the dramatic increase in life expectancy, coupled 
                                                                                                                         
of shortening the collective tenure, which shows that no change or trend toward an 
amendment has been effected within the body of the Court). 
 77 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 772 (however, the authors neglect the fact 
that according to their own data, Justices were serving for more than twenty years just 
thirty-two years after the Court was created—given the short timespan during which the 
Court was constituted and Justices started serving for decades, it seems senseless to say 
that the Founders did not foresee and did not intend such a result when granting tenure 
“during good Behaviour”). 
 78 Id. at 777 (“Americans have experienced drastic changes in medicine, technology, 
politics, and social perceptions of judges”). 
 79 See Stras & Scott, supra note 72. Professors Stras and Scott deconstruct Calabresi 
and Lindgren’s claims that life tenure is “fundamentally flawed,” and that increases in 
Supreme Court tenure have been “astonishing” and “unprecedented.” Id. at 792–93. 
 80 Id. at 778. 
 81 Clayne Pope, Adult Mortality in America Before 1900: A View from Family 
Histories, in STRATEGIC FACTORS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY: A VOLUME TO HONOR ROBERT W. FOGEL 267, 280 (Claudia Goldin & Hugh 
Rockoff eds., 1992) (showing that for birth periods 1760 through 1799, the average life 
expectancy at age twenty was 43.5 years for men and 44.2 years for women; for the time 
period from 1800 through 1819, the average life expectancy was 43.4 years for men and 
42.5 years for women); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65 
Years of Age, and at 75 Years of Age, by Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years 1900–
2007, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2010/022.pdf (last visited July 4, 2016) (showing 
that the average life expectancy for a male born in 2007 is 75.4 years while for a woman 
born in the same year, the average life expectancy is 80.4 years). The data shows that over 
the past two centuries, the average life expectancy for women has increased by at least 36.2 
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with the short increase in average tenure, dispenses with the idea that the 
increase in life expectancy has encouraged Justices to remain on the bench 
longer; rather, the increased life expectancy seems to have encouraged 
Justices to serve for a slightly longer period of time, but retire from the 
bench rather than die while on the bench.82 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES WOULD BE IMPLICATED 
IN EXPANDING THE LEGISLATURE’S POWER THROUGH 
SUPREME COURT TERM LIMITS: TAKING POWER FROM THE 
JUDICIARY WOULD FURTHER EMPOWER THE LEGISLATURE 
In effect, if the Legislature were successful in passing an amendment 
limiting the Judiciary’s term, this transformation would redefine the role 
of the Judiciary and would empower the Legislature far more than the 
Founders intended.83  If the Legislature succeeded in passing such an 
amendment, the Legislature would be taking power away from the 
Judiciary and would instead reserve that power for itself.  By its very 
nature, if the Legislature finds within its own power the ability to limit that 
of another branch beyond the constitutional mandates, the Legislature has 
expanded the power it was given. 
Currently, the Judiciary holds the power to determine its own term. 
A Justice can leave the bench when he sees fit for whatever reason he or 
she may choose; in exceptional circumstances, a Justice may be 
impeached, but this situation seldom occurs.84  However, if an amendment 
were passed that imposed a set term for Justices, the Court’s members 
would no longer have the power to determine the duration of each of their 
own terms.  The Legislature would have full power to decide, at the 
passage of the amendment, how long a Justice should be permitted to 
serve.  That power has time immemorial been reserved to the Court, and 
it would contravene the set boundaries of the Legislature’s power to 
allocate it to any other body. 
                                                                                                                         
years when considering the data conservatively, while the male life expectancy has shown 
an increase of thirty-two years, again when considering the data conservatively. 
 82 See Bump, supra note 31 (explaining that Justice Antonin Scalia is only the third 
Justice to die on the bench since the latter half of the twentieth century; prior to Justice 
Scalia’s death, Chief Justice William Rehnquist died while sitting on the bench in 2005 
and Chief Justice Fred Vinson died in 1953). 
 83 MADISON, supra note 11, at 282–88 (arguing that it is a fundamental principle that 
the separation of powers system be maintained and that it is just as fundamental that each 
branch exercise its own powers without invasion from the other two branches). 
 84 Richard B. Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 49 (1960). 
The only Supreme Court Justice to be impeached in American history is Associate Justice 
Samuel Chase, who was impeached in 1805 and later acquitted by the United States Senate. 
228 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:203 
Regardless of whether there is a finite amount of power that must be 
divvied up between the three branches, the nature of determining term 
limits for the Judiciary dictates that this power cannot be shared by two 
branches simultaneously.  Professor Charles Geyh asserts that the life 
tenure granted to Article III judges and Justices is a form of “doctrinal 
independence,” in that it is granted in the text of the Constitution.85  
Professor Geyh goes on to briefly discuss what may be considered a threat 
to doctrinal independence, and it follows from his examples that an 
amendment revoking life tenure would be such a threat.86 
Although the Appointments Clause87 provides minimal guidance, at 
best, as to how Supreme Court Justices are to come by their appointments, 
the current method of appointing Supreme Court Justices involves a 
nomination by the President once a vacancy presents itself, followed by 
confirmation by a simple majority in the Senate.88  Thereafter, the newly 
confirmed Justice remains on the bench either until he or she chooses to 
retire, or dies on the bench.  However, were the proposed eighteen-year 
term limit to become a constitutional amendment, the President’s power 
to appoint Justices would be diluted because his appointees would no 
                                                                                                                         
 85 Charles Gardner Geyh, The State of the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of 
America’s Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence, 82 IND. L.J. 1215, 1217 (2007) (“a 
federal judge’s tenure during good behavior is explicitly guaranteed by Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution and is thus a matter of doctrinal independence”). 
 86 Id. n.13 (explaining that a bill, “which proposed not only to strip the federal courts 
of jurisdiction . . . but to disregard a judicial order, thereby arguably encroaching on 
judicial power and violating the separation of powers” would threaten doctrinal 
independence (citing Bill Ruthhart, Sodrel: Prayer Measure Fights “Judicial Activism,” 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22, 2006, at B6)). 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme court”). Note that the 
Advice and Consent Clause is frequently criticized as being one of the most ambiguous 
phrases in the Constitution, as it sets out no method by which the Senate is to give its 
“Advice and Consent,” nor does it give any semblance of a clue as to how strongly 
weighted the Senate’s “Advice and Consent” should be. 
 88 While there is no rule explicitly dictating how many votes are necessary to confirm 
a Justice, the cloture rule provides that a simple majority vote in the Senate is necessary to 
defeat a filibuster. Prior to invocation of the nuclear option to change Senate Rule XXII as 
it applies to Supreme Court nominees, a three-fifths vote of the entire Senate was necessary 
to defeat a filibuster; however, this rule died in order to allow the confirmation of now-
Justice Neil Gorsuch. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to 
Clear Path for Gorsuch, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html. A nominee cannot be 
approved if an ongoing filibuster does not come to an end; therefore, in order for a 
nomination to even come to a vote, fifty-one senators must vote to end the filibuster—
voting to end the filibuster in order to bring the nomination to a vote is closely related to 
voting on the nomination itself because if a favorable nominee can garner enough support 
to defeat a filibuster, he or she is likely to receive enough votes to earn the appointment. 
Conversely, if the filibuster is never called to an end, the Senate will never vote on the 
nominee, and he or she will not receive the appointment. 
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longer remain on the bench until either retirement or death, but would 
rather be forced to leave the bench after eighteen years. 
The current practice allows a President’s legacy to live on 
indefinitely, as there is no measurable way to predict when a Justice will 
leave the bench—this has become a primary method of exercising the 
Presidential power in a way that allows the political ideologies of that 
President to outlast his Presidency.89  If this were to change, not only 
would the political balance shift moving forward, but the Legislature 
would succeed in grasping a portion of the Executive’s power that is 
considered to be of primary importance in creating a lasting impression on 
the Nation.  Furthermore, the Founders saw fit to grant the appointment 
power to the President, knowing that Supreme Court Justices had been 
granted life tenure; were the President to be deprived of his power to 
appoint Justices for life (and thereby exercise his power beyond his 
Presidential term), the Legislature would violate Article II of the 
Constitution.  As a result, such an amendment would not only be 
unconstitutional in terms of Article III, but it would be unconstitutional in 
terms of Article II, as it would deprive the President of one of his 
constitutionally granted powers. 
When a branch of government loses a portion of its independence, 
that independence must go somewhere—there must be some reason why 
that independence has been lost, and the power associated with that 
independence likewise must resurface elsewhere, unless a power is 
abolished in its entirety.  If life tenure were removed from the Constitution, 
the power of a Justice to determine his or her own term would not be 
abolished entirely; rather, that power would transfer to the Legislature, 
were the amendment at issue to be formally introduced in Congress and 
subsequently passed.  It would be incorrect to argue that this power would 
cease to exist because some entity must determine a Justice’s term—
currently, a Justice determines his or her own term; if no party were 
responsible for determining a Justice’s term, Justices would have to remain 
on the bench in perpetuity, which, realistically speaking, means until 
death.  This is not a practical proposition due to the uncertainty and 
political battles that ensue following a sitting Justice’s death, and this 
would not be conducive to an effective Judiciary.90 
                                                                                                                         
 89 Just as some may argue that Supreme Court Justices have been holding too much 
power for too long and accountability is warranted, some may also argue that allowing a 
President’s legacy to live on in the Court for decades after he leaves office is allowing the 
Executive to exercise too much power from beyond the Oval Office. 
 90 Consider Justice Antonin Scalia’s recent death. Justice Scalia died roughly nine 
months before the 2016 presidential election, resulting in a slew of politically fueled 
statements and arguments. Prior to confirmation of Judge Gorsuch, the Court was 
comprised of eight Justices, which was problematic as cases were permitted to be decided 
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As this power would not be abolished in its entirety, it must vest 
elsewhere and would no longer reside with the Judiciary.  The Legislature 
is responsible for constitutional amendments and, although it acts at the 
behest of the people, the Legislature itself is considered to retain those 
rights associated with legislation.  Therefore, if an amendment were 
passed that took away from the Judiciary the ability to determine its own 
terms, that power must go to the Legislature because the Legislature is the 
body responsible for passing amendments and setting the specific terms of 
those amendments.  As a result, if the Legislature were to pass an 
amendment reducing life tenure to a single eighteen-year term, the 
Legislature would intentionally be taking away one of the foundational 
powers of the Judiciary, and immediately reserving for itself the ability to 
exercise that power. 
V. EVEN IF SUCH AN AMENDMENT WERE LAWFUL, IT WOULD 
NOT ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL OF LIMITING JUDICIAL POWER 
Those who favor an amendment limiting the term for Supreme Court 
Justices are not attacking the power wielded by individual members of the 
Judiciary for an extensive period of time.  They are attacking the idea of 
nine very well known people sitting on the highest Court in the country, 
gaining notoriety, and making decisions that are unpopular with at least 
one side.  If the amendment’s supporters were actually attacking the power 
held by the Judiciary, those supporters would be calling for a complete 
reform of Article III tenure as opposed to reform for just the Supreme 
Court. 
 
                                                                                                                         
without a majority for more than one year, consequently allowing circuit court decisions 
to stand on issues important enough that they warranted Supreme Court review. 
Furthermore, it takes time to nominate and confirm a Justice—albeit, it may not be much 
time under ordinary circumstances, but the Court cannot cease to function during the time 
in which it lacks a full Court. Finally, Justice Scalia’s death gives a nice preview of the 
situation of a Justice’s death in an election year, but the implications could be far more 
dramatic if a sitting Justice were to die closer to an election. Were that to happen, the 2016 
political atmosphere surrounding the next appointee would pale in comparison to the 
situation of a Justice dying within one or two months of an election taking place. If the 
Executive were to change hands and shift to the opposing political party as a result of a 
Presidential election, there is a good possibility that midnight appointments could occur 
with respect to empty Supreme Court appointments, provided the Senate were willing to 
cooperate with the departing President. 
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A. Circuit Court Supremacy 
Many circuit courts hold a vast amount of power—in some 
situations, just as much power as the Supreme Court.91  The Supreme 
Court is unable to hear the vast majority of cases in which a petition for 
certiorari is filed.92  However, there are certain types of cases that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to take than others; it is known that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari in a case that exhibits a 
circuit split. 93  If an important case presents itself to a Circuit Court that 
the circuit judge believes warrants Supreme Court review, the circuit judge 
will likely be inclined to decide the case in a manner that increases the 
chances that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to hear that case and 
thereby create binding precedent.94  As judges frequently employ strategy 
in their decisions, it is reasonable to believe that this strategy plays a role 
in deciding a case with respect to the potential for Supreme Court review.  
There are certain issues that affect the entire Nation and are more 
appropriate for Supreme Court review than circuit review.95 Knowing that 
the Supreme Court is unable to hear every case presented, judges use their 
insight into the certiorari-granting process to decide those few important 
                                                                                                                         
 91 When the Supreme Court declines to hear cases in a certain legal field for a number 
of years, or in situations wherein there is no majority holding, the circuit court’s decision 
stands, often for a great length of time, until the Supreme Court determines to hear a similar 
case and successfully reaches a majority holding on the issue. See Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Ass’n., 578 U.S. ___ (2016) (holding was a 4-4 split decision, following the death 
of Justice Scalia; such a split meant that the Supreme Court did not reach a majority 
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below would stand as governing law). 
 92 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 
(last visited May 19, 2017) (the Supreme Court is only able to accept roughly two percent 
of the cases it is asked to hear each year). 
 93 H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 246–52 (1991) (showing that the existence of a circuit split is perhaps the 
most “important generalizable factor” in determining whether to grant certiorari. Note that 
the entirety of chapter eight is dedicated to “Certworthiness” and discusses the factors that 
are most relevant in granting certiorari as well as those factors that tend to immediately 
disqualify a case from being one of the few the Supreme Court determines to hear). 
 94 Id. at 251 (suggesting that when there is a known circuit split and jurisdiction would 
be proper in multiple circuits, litigants may find it wiser to file a case in a circuit that lacks 
favorable precedent, if doing so means that the Supreme Court is likely to hear the case on 
appeal. A litigant can thereby increase his or her chances of appealing the case to the 
Supreme Court and allowing the Court to create binding precedent). Litigants are not the 
only parties who are able to take advantage of such a strategy. It is a short leap to reason 
that judges may employ this same insight into the certiorari-granting process in order to 
take advantage of an opportunity to allow the Supreme Court to create binding precedent 
in an area that may not otherwise be ripe for Supreme Court review for years, if ever. 
 95 Enduring issues and those issues that are far-reaching, such as gay marriage, are 
more appropriate for disposition by the highest Court than for final disposition by an 
intermediate court. 
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cases in a manner that increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court will 
take the case, such as by creating a circuit split 
In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the Court failed to 
reach a majority decision, meaning that the Ninth Circuit’s decision would 
stand as the governing law.96  While there is no definitive way to ascertain 
how long the Ninth Circuit’s decision will stand, this outcome is 
noteworthy because it shows that the Ninth Circuit is effectively 
exercising the power of the Supreme Court by virtue of asserting the 
holding in a case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
In granting certiorari, the Court asserts its power to hear and decide 
cases.  However, when the Court fails to decide a case, a decision must 
come from somewhere—the current practice for allowing cases like 
Friedrichs to be decided is by allowing the lower court’s decision to stand.  
When this occurs, the lower court assumes the power of the Supreme Court 
that the Court exercised by granting certiorari. Although the Court’s entire 
power does not exist in its ability to grant or deny certiorari, a significant 
portion of the Court’s power vests in this ability.  Therefore, when the 
Court exercises this power then subsequently allows a lower court’s 
decision to stand for lack of a majority holding, the Supreme Court is 
thereby allowing this power to subsume in the lower court. 
Consider also the situation wherein the Supreme Court lacks 
quorum.97  When a quorum does not exist to hear a case, the Chief Justice 
may order a case remitted to the appellate court that heard the case below 
so that a decision may be issued.98  Although it is infrequent for such a 
case to present itself, the Court to grant certiorari, then subsequently be 
unable to hear the case for lack of quorum,99 this was the situation 
                                                                                                                         
 96 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th 
Cir.  Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (the Supreme Court’s 
opinion read, in its entirety “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”). 
 97 A quorum is six Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1948). 
 98 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1948). 
If a case brought to the Supreme Court by direct appeal from a district court 
cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of 
qualified justices, the Chief Justice of the United States may order it remitted 
to the court of appeals for the circuit including the district in which the case 
arose. 
 99 See LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT: SUPREME COURT 
RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 80–83 (2016) (identifying only one case—Alcoa—in 
which certiorari was actually granted, but later left undecided by the Supreme Court for 
want of quorum). However, Professor Louis Virelli identifies several cases in which the 
Court simply determined not to a hear a case for lack of quorum—each case wherein the 
Court denied certiorari solely because it lacked quorum is a situation that prevented the 
Court from exercising the fullest extent of its power, and thereby leaving no choice but to 
allow a lower decision to stand, even if the Court did not desire to effect such a result. 
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presented in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa).100  
As a result, the case was ultimately heard and decided by the Second 
Circuit, whose decision has not been overturned by the Supreme Court. 
Because the Supreme Court could not attain a quorum, it expressly 
transferred its power to a lower court because the Supreme Court ventured 
to take a case that it was later unable to decide.  The end result was that 
the Supreme Court exercised the option to allow a lower court to absorb 
its power for the purpose of deciding Alcoa, which was important enough 
to warrant a grant of certiorari. 
In effect, the Second Circuit sat in place of the Supreme Court. 
Although the Second Circuit’s decision is not binding on all other circuit 
courts in the same way that a Supreme Court decision would be, this case 
is still widely considered good law and is a landmark case in the antitrust 
arena.  Even though the Second Circuit did not absorb the entirety of the 
Supreme Court’s power for the purpose of deciding Alcoa, the Second 
Circuit absorbed whatever power is associated with the Supreme Court’s 
ability to determine a case.  As this decision has stood for more than 
seventy years and is recognized almost exclusively as the leading decision 
on the issue therein presented,101 it could be suggested that the Second 
Circuit’s decision holds nearly the same weight as a Supreme Court 
decision would have because lower courts rarely seek to hold in opposition 
to Alcoa. 
Judge Learned Hand was one of the three judges who presided over 
Alcoa; although he never gained a seat on the Supreme Court,102 Judge 
Hand is one of the most influential jurists in American history, and his 
teachings live on today.103  Judge Learned Hand’s tenure on the Second 
                                                                                                                         
 100 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 320 U.S. 708 (1943) (having previously 
granted certiorari, four Justices subsequently disqualified themselves, rendering the Court 
unable to determine the case; as a result, the Court transferred the case to a special docket 
and postponed hearing the case until such time as quorum was attained—such quorum was 
never reached); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 716 (1944) (deciding to 
transfer the case to the Second Circuit, as a quorum was still lacking); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945) (proceeding with final disposition of the case 
and determining that Alcoa had, in fact, engaged in anticompetitive practices). 
 101 See contra United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (2004) (rejecting 
portions of the Second Circuit’s holding in Alcoa). 
 102 He was nominated for a Supreme Court seat twice and was rejected both times. 
 103 Mark M. Arkin, “The Tenth Justice:” A Review of Learned Hand by Gerald 
Gunther, 12 THE NEW CRITERION 75 (2016) (available at 
https://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/-ldquo-The-Tenth-Justice-rdquo—4964) 
(reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)) (when 
asked which Supreme Court Justice was the “greatest living American jurist,” Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo stated, “‘The greatest living American jurist isn’t on the Supreme 
Court’ He was, of course, referring to Learned Hand”). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals endured for thirty-seven years104—longer than 
the longest-serving Supreme Court Justice.105 Judge Thomas Swan, who 
also presided over Alcoa, served on the Second Circuit for thirty-eight 
years,106 while Judge Augustus N. Hand sat on the bench for twenty-seven 
years.107 
Given that both Judges Learned Hand and Thomas Swan served 
longer than any Supreme Court Justice,108 and only one current Justice has 
served longer than Judge Augustus Hand served,109 it must be questioned 
what critics of life tenure for the Supreme Court are really criticizing.  
These three judges presided over and decided a vast number of cases, 
many of which are still controlling decades after these judges left the 
bench.  They held an extreme amount of power for an extended period of 
time, and their influences are still highly regarded and frequently 
controlling.  Yet, even though these three judges served on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals and exercised arguably more power than many 
Justices have—and quite possibly more than any Justice could exercise in 
eighteen years—those who advocate for an eighteen-year term only 
suggest such a term for the Supreme Court, not for the lower federal courts 
that are often subject to judges like Learned Hand, Thomas Swan, and 
Augustus Hand. 
These scenarios, wherein a circuit court exercises a substantial 
amount of the Supreme Court’s power and judges serve on circuit courts 
longer than any Supreme Court Justice, serve to support the proposition 
that those who seek to impose a limited tenure on Supreme Court Justices 
really are not attacking the power wielded by the Court for an extended 
period of time.  If the supporters of such an amendment were truly opposed 
to such a great amount of power residing with a few individuals for an 
                                                                                                                         
 104 Id. 
 105 Justice William O. Douglas served on the Supreme Court for thirty-six years, which 
is the longest tenure for any Supreme Court Justice to date. William O. Douglas, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_o_douglas (last visited May 19, 2017). 
 106 Judge Swan retired from full service and took senior status for his last twelve years 
on the bench. Second Cir. Hist. and Commemorative Events Committee, Special 
Supplement: Colleagues for Justice: One Hundred Years of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L.R. 937, 939 (1991). 
 107 Judge Augustus Hand took senior status for his final year on the bench. Id. 
 108 Justice Douglas was the longest serving Supreme Court Justice. William O. Douglas, 
OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_o_douglas (last visited May 19, 2017). 
 109 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has served as an Associate Justice for twenty-nine 
years to date, three years longer than Judge Augustus Hand served. At the time of his death, 
Justice Antonin Scalia had been on the bench for twenty-nine years as well. Members of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited May 12, 2017). 
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extended period of time, they would attack all Article III judges, not just 
Supreme Court Justices. 
B. Shortening Supreme Court Tenure Will Not Lessen Judicial Power 
Those who support an eighteen-year term are of the opinion that 
shortening the term of a Supreme Court Justice will lessen his or her 
power.  However, those who support such an amendment fail to recognize  
the power that will continue to vest in the former Justice, once he or she 
leaves the Supreme Court bench, if he or she takes a seat on a lower court.  
As shown above, circuit courts can hold incredible amounts of power and 
the same judges can sit together for decades.  If Article III is amended to 
allow for a single eighteen-year term on the Supreme Court, followed by 
the option to maintain life tenure on a lower court, it is possible that a 
circuit court could be composed entirely, or almost entirely, of former 
Supreme Court Justices. Were this to occur, the federal Judiciary would 
essentially have a Supreme Court and an unofficial supreme court at the 
lower level, composed exclusively of those whose time had run out at the 
Supreme Court level. 
Those former Justices serving on circuit courts would be accorded a 
greater level of respect than those circuit judges who never served on the 
Supreme Court simply because if one attains the title of Supreme Court 
Justice, his or her opinion on legal matters is typically given more weight 
by virtue of his or her experience with the highest Court.  As a result, the 
decisions rendered by former Justices, while not possessing the same 
binding effect as Supreme Court issued decisions, would likely carry more 
influence than a decision written by a judge who had never sat on the 
Supreme Court. This would create a tiered effect in the federal Judiciary 
wherein district judges would be the least powerful members of the federal 
Judiciary, ordinary circuit judges would hold more power than district 
judges, but less power than former Justices, and current Supreme Court 
Justices would hold marginally more power than their counterparts whose 
tenure had expired. 
Because the Supreme Court takes so few cases each year, this tiered 
system could lead plaintiffs to file cases in a jurisdiction where every 
circuit judge is a former Justice.  Such strategic legal maneuvering would 
allow a party to appeal a trial court’s decision to a court whose decision is 
likely to be influential for years to come.  While it is always possible that 
the circuit court’s decision could be appealed to and overturned by the 
Supreme Court, filing in a jurisdiction where a party is guaranteed an 
appeal to an incredibly influential court is dangerous.  This maneuvering 
would thus eliminate a key component of the Supreme Court in its ability 
to grant or deny certiorari.  Not all cases are worthy of appeal to the 
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Supreme Court, and some cases contain issues that the Supreme Court 
does not see fit to weigh in on at that point in time. 
However, if a circuit court were to be composed entirely of former 
Justices whose opinions are highly regarded, a party who lost at the trial 
level in that circuit would be guaranteed an appeal to that circuit court.  
This would force a court that is more powerful than any current circuit 
court to hear cases and create precedent on issues that may not be 
appropriate for such strong precedent at that time.110  This is one of the key 
reasons behind the power to grant or deny certiorari—it is dangerous to 
force courts holding that magnitude of power to hear certain cases.111 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court could be less inclined to take cases 
heard by a circuit court constituted almost entirely of former Justices. As 
stated above, such a court would hold enough power that its decisions 
would be highly regarded and would be extremely persuasive authority, 
where those decisions were not binding.  As a result, the Supreme Court 
would frequently not see fit to expend judicial resources on cases decided 
by such a circuit court, unless the Supreme Court intended to overturn the 
decision, because of the highly influential nature of the circuit court’s 
decision.  With a heavy docket, the Supreme Court cannot afford to spend 
time hearing and deciding cases just to affirm the decision of a court whose 
                                                                                                                         
 110 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (suggesting that 
twenty-five years after this landmark affirmative action holding, such affirmative action 
would no longer be necessary to ensure educational equality). Although the Court granted 
certiorari in Grutter and subsequently rendered an opinion, the Court expressly stated that 
it anticipated that its holding would become obsolete within twenty-five years; however, 
at the time this case presented itself, the Court found it inappropriate to strike down the 
type of affirmative action scheme presented therein. The importance lies in the 
acknowledgement that this holding would not endure, and was not intended to endure 
indefinitely; rather, this holding was intended to endure only so long as it was necessary—
in effect, the Court intended its Grutter decision to stand only so long as the political and 
social climate regarding equal opportunities in education remained unchanged. Once the 
climate changed, the Court intended for the law to change with that climate. The notion 
that underscores this holding is that the Grutter Court understood that affirmative action 
should not be the law indefinitely, but at the time Grutter presented itself, America was not 
in a position to accept an educational system that lacked affirmative action. As a result, the 
Court deferred striking down affirmative action until such time when it was no longer 
needed from either a political or social standpoint. 
 111 See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law 
Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV.  1, 10–11 (2011) (asserting that the Judiciary Act of 1891 
was originally intended, largely, to give the Court the discretionary power of certiorari in 
order to ease the workload of the overburdened Court). However, the power to grant or 
deny certiorari has evolved to the point where it is now considered of vital importance to 
the Court in terms of regulating its decisions based on political and social ideologies of the 
time. Note also that the Judiciary Act of 1891 created discretionary review of cases, which 
implies that Congress intended for the Court to use its best judgment, in whatever form it 
may take, in deciding which cases are ripe for review. 
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power is only marginally lesser than its own and whose decision would 
likely stand for years to come, even absent Supreme Court review. 
It is doubtful that such an “unofficial Supreme Court” at the circuit 
level would have the effect of easing the true Supreme Court’s workload 
since the Supreme Court currently accepts only up to roughly two percent 
of the cases it is asked to review in any given year.112  Such a low 
acceptance rate could indicate either: the Court refuses to accept the other 
thousands of cases for reasons other than time and resource constraints; or 
the Court simply lacks time and resources to hear all of these cases.  It is 
possible that the Court has a political, ideological, or legal reason for 
refusing to accept each of the cases it is asked to review, but in light of the 
state of the Judiciary as a whole, the more likely reason is that the Court 
simply does not have enough time or resources to hear each case and issue 
a decision.  As an abundance of cases would likely warrant review if the 
Supreme Court were able to hear them, those cases that would otherwise 
go unheard would likely take the place of cases reviewed by the circuit 
court composed almost entirely of former Justices.  The end result would 
be more cases being heard by a powerful court, but no less of a burden on 
the Supreme Court. 
It could benefit America if more issues were heard by a court whose 
presence were similar to that of the Supreme Court, but the issue still exists 
as to the right to appellate review and the notion that not all issues should 
be heard by a court whose power approaches that of the Supreme Court.  
It would be more dangerous to allow these issues to reach a court of this 
power than it would be to continue the status quo wherein only a small 
percentage of arguably important issues are considered and decided by the 
Supreme Court.  Forcing the creation of powerful precedent could have 
unintended consequences, whereas declining to create powerful precedent 
carries with it the consequence of situations remaining stagnant.  Precedent 
is more difficult to overturn at a later time than the stagnancy from a 
declination to decide a case.  Therefore, if one must decide between 
creating undesirable precedent and refusing to take any action at all, 
resulting in the continuation of a negative situation, he or she should 
choose the latter, or he or she will risk not being able to undo the 
undesirable precedent at a later date.  Hence, the Court has the power of 
certiorari, which allows it to exercise judgment in determining which 
cases should not be decided by a court possessing such a great degree of 
                                                                                                                         
 112 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 
(last visited May 19, 2017) (the Supreme Court accepts roughly 100 to 150 “of the more 
than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year,” which equates to roughly two percent, 
when calculated conservatively). 
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power; however, if a circuit court were composed almost entirely of 
former Justices, this power of certiorari would diminish and precedent that 
otherwise would not have been created could come into existence. 
VI. “POLITICAL LIBERTY” AND DEPRIVATION OF THE POWER 
TO DECIDE CASES ON THE MERITS 
With Marbury v. Madison, the Court found within Article III the 
power of the Supreme Court to decide cases, and to do so on the merits of 
those cases.113  For more than two hundred years the Supreme Court has 
exercised this power, and this power has become fundamental to the 
American Judiciary—if the Court did not have the power to decide cases 
on the merits, or if it uniformly opted not to exercise that power, the Nation 
would have no meaningful court of last resort.114  However, were the term 
limit proposal to become a formal constitutional amendment, its legality 
would undoubtedly be challenged and the Supreme Court would be faced 
with the question of whether such an amendment is unconstitutional.  If 
presented with this situation, the Court would be deprived of its 
fundamental power to decide cases on the merits, as the Court would have 
no real choice but to determine the case on any grounds other than the 
merits.  Hence, the passage of such an amendment would not only be 
unconstitutional in its own right, but it would unconstitutionally deprive 
the Supreme Court of the power it has exercised since Marbury.115 
                                                                                                                         
 113 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803). In determining the outcome of this 
case, the Court made a bold move in asserting its power to not only act as a court 
empowered to determine cases in controversy, but also to decide those cases on the merits; 
by finding that deliverance of a commission is not necessary for an officer to actually take 
office, the Court decided the case on the merits as opposed to procedural grounds, which 
it easily could have done, thereby avoiding the issue of whether William Marbury was 
entitled to the commission as of right; note that although the Court determined that 
Marbury was entitled to the commission, Marbury ultimately lost the case on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
 114 If the Court were to decline to decide any cases on the merits, the only true course 
of action an appellant would have would be to find some procedural flaw in the proceedings 
below, and appeal on those bases. However, this presents a problem when it is considered 
that the Supreme Court is responsible for reconciling circuit splits, those issues that come 
before it based on original jurisdiction, and other substantive matters that the courts below 
incorrectly decide. A meritorious Supreme Court is fundamental to the United States 
Judiciary because without such a Court, there would be no body responsible for ensuring 
that laws and the Constitution are carried out uniformly throughout the country—each 
state, territory, and circuit would operate under its own interpretation of the Constitution 
and federal laws, which would create a disjointed Nation. 
 115 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138 (determining that the Supreme Court holds the power to 
determine cases on the merits). 
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The Supreme Court’s authority derives from public confidence in the 
Court.116  Such confidence will only sustain as long as the public believes 
in the Court and believes that the Court is acting out of concern for the 
Nation as a whole; if the Court were to strike down an amendment limiting 
Justices to a single eighteen-year term, the public perception would be that 
the Court is protecting itself and its own interests, as opposed to the 
interests of the public.  This is not a viable option for the Court to pursue 
because the moment it finds in its own favor, a large portion of the public 
will view the result as nothing more than a self-serving holding that lacks 
a basis in Supreme Court precedent.  The effect would not be such as to 
maintain the power the Court has exercised for more than two hundred 
years, as intended; rather, by holding to maintain the status quo, the true 
effect would be to lessen the Court’s power by lessening public confidence 
in the Court.  The Court’s authority is a direct result of public confidence; 
therefore, if public confidence in the Court lessens, the authority of the 
Court will lessen as well. 
Conversely, if the Court were to uphold such an amendment, it would 
severely curtail its own power in a way that the Supreme Court is unlikely 
to do—practically speaking, the Supreme Court, which is currently 
composed of four Justices who have served in excess of eighteen years,117 
is unlikely to find that as of the eighteen-year mark, each Justice 
individually becomes incapable of rendering coherent decisions or is no 
longer fit to sit on the Court, simply by virtue of having served for just shy 
of two decades.  The likelihood of the Court turning to historical precedent 
with regard to Supreme Court tenure is remarkable and upon such 
findings—as well as the inherent nature of the Court—it is highly unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would actually see fit to lessen its own power in 
this way. 
Neither of the two potential scenarios that could result from a 
decision on the merits would be practical or beneficial when considering 
the effects either decision could have.  If this case were to present itself, 
the Court’s analysis would reveal that deciding the case on the merits is 
not a true option because doing so would be detrimental to the Court to the 
extent that its power would diminish in a way that it may never recover 
from.  As a result, the Court would not decide the case on the merits; 
                                                                                                                         
 116 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s 
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence”). 
 117 Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 19, 2017) 
(Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. 
Breyer have served on the Supreme Court in excess of eighteen years). 
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instead, the Court would seek an alternative way to dispose of the case 
gracefully,118 in order to maintain both public confidence and the power it 
has properly exercised since Marbury. 
Such an amendment would effectively deprive the Supreme Court of 
the power to decide cases on the merits.  By placing the Supreme Court in 
a position where it must decide whether to uphold its constitutionally 
granted power or preserve the public confidence that gives life to its 
decisions, the Court is being asked to make a choice between either giving 
up a significant amount of its power or giving up the confidence that gives 
its power meaning.119  Such a choice is no choice at all, but is actually an 
attempt to coerce the Supreme Court into holding that Article III does not 
create the Supreme Court that the Marbury Court found to exist.120 
The Supreme Court cannot afford to make this decision.  In 
considering the cost-benefit analysis, the Court would certainly find the 
costs of deciding on the merits to severely outweigh the benefits.  The 
ultimate effect would be that Congress would force the Court to forgo a 
portion of the power it has traditionally exercised since Marbury; under 
the separation of powers scheme, Congress is not empowered to lessen the 
Court’s authority in this way.121  The result would be an unconstitutional 
seizure of power from the Supreme Court by Congress. 122  As the 
Legislature is the most powerful branch and the Judiciary is the least 
powerful branch,123 such a seizure cannot be tolerated.124 
                                                                                                                         
 118 Such disposition could find the Court reaching its holding on procedural or standing 
grounds, or the like, in order to avoid the essential question. 
 119 See generally 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., rev. vol. 1914) at 161, 163 (“Political liberty is to be 
found . . . only when there is no abuse of power . . . . Again, there is no liberty, if the 
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive”). Although 
Montesquieu argues for separation of the Judiciary from the Legislature out of fear that the 
Judiciary would become abusive if it possessed both powers, it must be remembered that 
Montesquieu considered the Judiciary to be the least powerful branch. Id. at 167. It follows 
that Montesquieu was more concerned with the power the Legislature would bring to the 
Judiciary than with the power the Judiciary would bring to the Legislature. If the 
Legislature forces the Supreme Court to give up a portion of its power for lack of alternative 
options, the Legislature will invade the realm of the Judiciary and “political liberty” will 
necessarily suffer. 
 120 See, Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138. 
 121 Although this is an interesting argument, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 122 MADISON, supra note 11, at 282–88 (arguing that it is imperative that each branch 
exercise its own powers without intrusion from either of the other two branches). 
 123 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 119, at 167 (when discussing the interactions between the 
Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, Montesquieu posits “Of the three powers 
mentioned above, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing”). 
 124 Consider also that the Judiciary is intended as a check on the Legislature. If the 
Legislature can be permitted to take the Supreme Court’s power in a way that is not allowed 
for in the Constitution, the balance of power would become even more skewed and the 
Judiciary would quickly cease to have any meaningful existence. 
2017]  An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment 241 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The proposal that Supreme Court Justices be subjected to a single, 
non-renewable eighteen-year term would violate Article III of the United 
States Constitution, and such an amendment would find no constitutional 
basis outside of Article III.  The Founders intended to construct the 
Judiciary in a different manner than the Executive and the Legislature, in 
part by granting Article III judges life tenure.  To do away with this 
fundamental principle would be to eliminate one of the key protections 
afforded to the Supreme Court that enables it to perform its duties free 
from excessive political interference.  Even absent the Founders’ intent, 
there is no basis for such an amendment, as there is no standing tradition 
of eighteen-year terms, and there are no dire circumstances that mandate 
a break from the tradition of Justices determining their own terms.  
Furthermore, such an amendment could have the unintended consequence 
of forcing an overly powerful circuit court to issue opinions creating 
precedent that should not be created and that would be detrimental to the 
welfare of the Nation as a whole.  In short, were such an amendment to be 
passed, the Nation could face its first instance of an unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment. 
